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Abstract 
 
Network forensic techniques help in tracking different types of cyber attack by monitoring and 
inspecting network traffic. However, with the high speed and large sizes of current networks, 
and the sophisticated philosophy of attackers, in particular mimicking normal behaviour and/or 
erasing traces to avoid detection, investigating such crimes demands intelligent network 
forensic techniques. This paper suggests a real-time collaborative network Forensic scheme 
(RCNF) that can monitor and investigate cyber intrusions. The scheme includes three 
components of capturing and storing network data, selecting important network features using 
chi-square method and investigating abnormal events using a new technique called 
correntropy-variation. We provide a case study using the UNSW-NB15 dataset for evaluating 
the scheme, showing its high performance in terms of accuracy and false alarm rate compared 
with three recent state-of-the-art mechanisms.  
 
Keywords: Network forensics; Evidence analysis; Cyber-attacks; Correntropy-variation 
technique 
1. Introduction 
 
Due to the considerable increase of cyber attacks, network forensics isgrowing more 
sophisticated in methods used  for investigating such attacks. For example, in May 2017, 
the WannaCry ransomware attack that targets Microsoft Windows operating systems infected 
more than 230,000 computer systems in about 150 countries, with the software requesting 
ransom payments in the cryptocurrency Bitcoin [15]. Identifying the origins of such attacks 
require thedevelopment of more  network forensics investigation techniques  t for analysing 
network traffic in order to identify the source of security policy abuse or information assurance 
violation [1] [3][4].  
Although extracting network packets for forensic analysis is simple in theory, it requires an 
accurate inspection due to the current high speed and large size of networks and the  collection 
of  information from different heterogeneous sources [1] [5]. This accurate inspection needs an 
advanced feature selection method, which selects only relevant information, including attack 
patterns. Identifying the key features that capture important information is considered worthy 
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of further intelligent analysis in order to aggregate network observations and investigate the 
attack evidence [16].  
Multiple commercial and open source tools, including NIKSUN's NetDetector Suite, PyFlag 
and Xplico's tool, have been designed and applied to help network forensic examiners for 
carrying out the investigations of attacks [17]. These tools mainly depend on collecting flow 
information (i.e., IPs and ports) from network packets [1] [6]. However, such information is 
considered unreliable because of the mobile nature of appliances and the use of dynamic 
allocation of IP addresses [17]. Consequently, exploring the dependency of the flow 
information without analysing the transition between flows has become a challenge. This 
challenge is in  investigating what has occurred in terms of the broader attack and who was 
actually invlved in order to build an effective network forensic framework [17].  
In this study, we propose a Real-time Collaborative Network Forensic scheme (RCNF) that 
can monitor and track the origins of cyber attacks. The scheme involves three components. 
Firstly, capturing network data using a tcpdump sniffer tool [21], and then storing it in a 
MySQL database [22] in order to be much easier for analysing and aggregating network data 
using a suggested aggregator module.  After this, important features include potential 
characteristics of abnormal activities are selected using the chi-square method [18] [25]. 
Finally, we develop a correntropy variation technique that can specify a Risk Level (RL) for 
normal and attack observations as evidence analysis, as discussed in Section 4. The proposed 
RCNF and its modules are evaluated on the UNSW-NB15 dataset [14] as it has a wide range 
of contemporary authentic normal and abnormal observations.  
 
The main contributions in this paper are elaborated as follows. First, we propose a RCNF 
Scheme for investigating attack activities on large-scale networks. Second, we develop two 
new components in the scheme of aggregating network flows to reduce irrelevant observations 
and the Chi-Square feature selection method for reducing irrelevant features, in addition to a 
correntropy-variation technique for defining attack vectors and specifying its risk level.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The related work and existing network forensic 
techniques and frameworks are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the network forensic 
process while Section 4 provides the details of the RCNF scheme and its components. The 
results and discussions are provided in Section 5. Finally, the paper summary and future 
directions are presented in Section 6. 
2. Network forensic techniques and related work  
 
Several network forensic methods have been utilized to  vulnerabilities [1] [10] [12]. To begin 
with, the logging method is used for recording network data in a database to inspect attack 
evidence. Different attributes should be stored, for example, flow identifiers source/destination 
IP addresses and ports, and some statistical information about packets, such as a packet size 
and interval-packet length. Different algorithms, such as apriori, hypothesis testing, protocol 
analysis and immune, are used to track attack activities from the logged files [1] [10]. Secondly, 
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a packet-marking method is applied to mark network packets at different routers while sending 
flows from a sender to its receiver [12]. Machine learning and heuristic approaches are also 
widely used for modelling and investigating attack events throughout networks [1] [13]. These 
approaches help to detect different normal and suspicious instances in the training phases and 
then validates the approaches’ correctness for recognising suspicious instances in the testing 
phase [14].    
Multiple network forensic frameworks have been proposed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]. Firstly, a 
traceback-based framework is used to identify the origin of network packets, which are used 
for investigating attack paths of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and IP spoofing attacks 
[2]. Multiple trace-back mechanisms should be incorporated in order to defend against these 
attacks from large-scale networks. For example, Wang et al. [3] developed a topology assisted 
deterministic packet marking technique based on an IP traceback for tracking DoS and DDoS 
attacks. Cheng et al. [4] suggested a cloud-based traceback architecture in order to tackle the 
access control challenge in cloud systems. The goal of the study is to prevent normal users 
from requesting traceback information for malicious intentions.  
 
Secondly, a converged network-based framework defines digital evidence in VoIP 
communication [1] [5]. Voice packet is breached by attackers during voice communication 
which changes a normal voice packet to a suspicious one. For instance, Ibrahim et al. [5] 
designed a VoIP evidence model for investigating attacks in VoIP communication by making 
a hypothesis based on information collected. In [6], the authors used some existing network 
forensics techniques to model network vulnerability and network evidence graph. In it, network 
vulnerability evidence and reasoning techniques were used for reconstructing malicious 
scenarios and then backtracking the network packets to get the original evidence. Thirdly, an 
attack graph-based framework discovers and visualises all possible attack paths throughout a 
network by analysing computer and network systems [1]. A probabilistic method [8] was 
proposed based on Bayesian inference for designing evidence graphs. This method can address 
false positive rates and inspect evidence by computing the posterior probabilities.   
 
The distributive based framework is also proposed for investigating cyber crimes in order to 
handle the scalability problem by distributing network forensic servers and data agent systems 
[1]. In [9], a network forensic architecture is suggested. This architecture comprises five 
components: collection and indexing, database management, an analysis component, analysis 
communication component and the database for collecting and analysing abnormal patterns. 
Finally, a network intrusion detection framework is used for monitoring and protecting 
malicious activities. Network Forensics based on intrusion detection systems executes static 
and dynamic inspection for network abnormal data [10]. Wang et al. [11] proposed a hybrid 
attack detection and forensic technique in machine-to-machine networks. In addition, this 
technique was designed for recognising DDoS attacks in a distributed anti-honeypot- based 
forensics architecture.   
 
Although existing frameworks can investigate attack activities to some extent, the high speed 
and large sizes of current networks cause a big challenge of extracting important information 
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that can be used for investigating the origin of attacks, and a methodology of investigating 
abnormal activities with a confidence level that reveals to what extent the risks of those 
activities. Moreover, existing network forensics techniques often consume high computational 
resources while investigating large-scale distributed networks without aggregating relevant 
flows that include an attack. These challenges are the motivation of our study and are addressed 
by designing an aggregation component that can collect only relevant information, as explained 
in Section 4. Then, we propose a correntropy-variation mechanism for investigating attacks by 
specifying a risk level for each network observation.    
3. Network forensic process 
  
The key functions of a network forensics technique are to log attackers’ behaviour and provide 
a forensic technique in order to inspect the data logged. Therefore, the information of attackers 
and the invasion process can be easily discovered [20]. A typical network forensics mechanism 
includes the basic steps for investigating and discovering the paths between the victims and 
attackers, shown in Figure 1. The network forensics mechanism analyses the capturing data 
and provides the analysis results, revealing the evidence of capturing anomalous observations 
based on the new correntropy-variation technique as discussed below. 
 
DetectionCollection
Preparation and 
Identification
starts the process of investigating 
network data
 logs network information about 
illegal activities
identifies abnormal events
Preservation
maintains original network 
data and a copy of data is 
inspected
Examination 
and 
Analysis
integrates data collected in a 
database and examines data 
collected using different statistical 
tools
Presentation
shows attack patterns in an 
understandable manner
Incident 
response
informs the system 
about abnormal actions
Network Forensics Process
 
Figure 1: Steps of network forensics techniques 
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4. Real-time Collaborative Network Forensic scheme 
 
The proposed Real-time Collaborative Network Forensic (RCNF) scheme comprises three key 
modules, as presented in Figure 2. Capturing and storing network data is the first stage to sniff 
network packets and log them into a database to make it much easier while investigating attack 
patterns. Then, selecting important features is the second stage to remove any redundant 
information that affects recognising attack activities. Finally, investigating attack events is a 
crucial phase of defining abnormal events and their origins, as detailed in the following three 
subsections.    
Network 
traffic
Estimate the mean of 
correntropy values from 
normal data
Estimate the correntropy 
value for each observed 
record 
            
 if there is a variation 
between 
normal and attack values,
 it will an attack
Chi-square technique for 
selecting important attributes
         Normal 
record
Attack 
record
Training
phase
Testing
phase
Correntropy – Variation network forensic technique
Selecting important features
Capturing and storing 
network data 
Sniffing 
tool Feature 
extraction
Simple random sampling for 
selecting relevant observations
Track flow identifiers of 
the attack
 
Figure 2: proposed RCNF architecture 
4.1 Capturing and storing network data 
 
The large number of flows of current networks demands an aggregation method starting from 
capturing packets to storing them in a database for summarising network activities and building 
the proposed RFCN. A tcpdump tool [21] is utilised for capturing the raw packets from the 
network interfaces as it reduces dropping packets in the production systems. Then, a number 
of features are generated from the packets using Bro and Argus tools, as in the UNSW-NB15 
dataset. Network traffic has to be sniffed at the checkpoints, in particular, ingress routers in 
order to collect only relevant flows based on their source and destination IP addresses and 
protocols. This leads to decrease the computational processing time and assists to investigate 
the origins of cyber adversaries using an advanced network forensic technique.  
 
The target of designing a collaborative RCNF can be achieved via collecting flows from all 
destination points across a network and storing those flows in a MySQL database that can be 
shared with different network forensics instances installed on the network. The flows are 
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recorded using the technology of MySQL Cluster CGE [22], which can handle large-scale data 
in real-time processing.  
 
The flows are aggregated via the MySQL’s functions [23] for grouping the data using more 
than one attribute of the flow identifiers. This addresses the drawbacks of the existing tools, 
such as Netflow and sFlows that can accumulate only one feature each time. The paths of 
attacks are easily investigated when the flows between the source and destination IP addresses 
are counted and tracked. For example, DDoS attacks send large numbers of pings to a specific 
target to disrupt its resources; therefore, if these pings are monitored and numbered, the origins 
of the attackers can be easily identified using the network forensic technique discussed in 
subsection 4.3. For tracking the non-stationary properties of flow identifiers, we apply the 
‘count’ functions to determine all possible combinations of these flows, as follows.  
 
 Select COUNT(*) as flows, srcip, dstip  from network_data group by srcip, dstip; 
 Select COUNT(*) as flows, srcip, srcport  from network_data group by srcip, srcport;  
 Select COUNT(*) as flows, dstip, dsport  from network_data group by dstip, dsport, 
srcport; 
 
In the above queries, flows denote the number of flows, which occurred between any two 
attributes, srcip refers to the source IP address, dstip refers to the destination IP address, srcport 
refers to the source port, dsport is the destination port, and proto refers to the protocols. Every 
query retrieves the number of flows which takes place amongst the features.  
A real-time and collaborative network forensics technique can be executed when the flows 
collected do not include duplicated ones or missing values. Consequently, we use the Simple 
Random Sampling (SRS) approach which selects a sample arbitrarily where no flows are 
included more than once within a sample size. All subsets of the examples are given equal 
probabilities. Moreover, any given pair of values has a similar probability of selection as the 
other pairs, reducing data bias and simplifying data analysis in which n samples are picked out 
of N examples [24].  
4.2 Selecting important features 
 
Besides selecting only relevant flows, the important features in the flows should be adopted to 
design the RFCN. We apply the chi-square feature selection method (𝑥2) [18] [25] due to its 
simplicity of implementation at real-time. Statistically speaking, the  𝑥2 is used for measuring 
the occurrences of two independent variables associated with their class label, and then the 
highest ranked variables are selected as important features using equation (1).   
    
2
, ,2
1 1 ,
( )y c i j i j
i j i j
O E
x
E 

  
(1) 
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where 𝑥2 refers to the chi-square of Independence, 𝑂𝑖,𝑗 denotes the observed value of two 
variables and 𝐸𝑖,𝑗 is the mean of two variables. 
4.3 Correntropy-variation technique for network forensics  
 
The correntropy-variation technique is a combination of correntropy [26] measure for 
estimating the similarities between normal and attack instances, and a variation threshold for 
discovering attacks. The correntropy is a nonlinear similarity function that reveals the 
relationships between normal and abnormal observations, while the variation estimates how 
far the abnormal instances from the normal ones. 
 
A correntropy of two random variables (f1 and f2) is estimated by 
 
 1 2 1 2( , ) ( )V f f E k f f    (2) 
 
where [.]E  refers to the mean of features, (.)k  is the Gaussian kernel function and   is the 
kernel size computed via  
2
2
1 (.)
(.) exp( )
22
K

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(3) 
 
The joint probability density function 
1, 2 1 2( ( , ))F FP f f  is unidentified, whilst a finite number of 
observations ( {𝑓𝑖, 𝑓𝑗}𝑖,𝑗=1
𝑀 ) is known. Consequently, the correntropy is measured via  
,
, 1
1
( , ) ( )
M
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M
 

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(4) 
 
To apply the correntropy for multivariate network data, as provided in equation (5), we 
calculate it for both normal and malicious observations as    
 
111 12
1: 1:
21 22
,N N
ij i
cf f
I Y
f cf f
   
    
  
 
(5) 
 
such that I  is the observations of network data, Y  is the class label ( )c  of each observation, 
N is the number of observations and F  is the number of features. 
The mean of correntropy values of normal vectors ( )normalcorpy  is computed using equation 6 
in the training phase. In the testing phase, the correntropy value ( )testcorpy is estimated for each 
record based on equations 4 and 5. We design a baseline between the ( )normalcorpy and each 
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testcorpy  using the standard deviation measure ( ) , which estimates the amount of variation 
between the mean of normal correntropy values and each correntropy of testing records. If the 
variation between the two values is greater than or equal (2 ) , the testing vector is considered 
as an attack, as given in equation 7. This is because such a vector is so far from the dispersion 
of normal correntropy values and is difficult to fit it within the same distribution of normal 
data. We called this threshold a Risk Level ( )RL  that can identify all attack observations with 
low false alarm rates. The RL is scaled in a range of [0, 1] in order to exactly specify to what 
extent the abnormal activates deviate from normal ones.  
1
( ) ( )normal normalcorpy corpy
N
   
(6) 
 
( ) ( ) 2normal test attackcorpy corpy
RL
normalelse
   
  
 
 
(7) 
 
 
The origins of attack instances can be easily tracked via correlating their flow identifiers with 
their estimated RL. This way will help to define the risk level of those instances. If the RL 
value equals one, this means that type of attacks constitutes the highest risk to an organisation 
as it sends many flows to a specific destination such as events of DDoS attacks. But. if the RL 
value equals zero, this indicates this type of attacks makes the lowest risk to that organisation.  
For example, Table 1 lists some flow identifiers from the UNSW-NB15 dataset with estimated 
RL values. We observe that the abnormal records have higher RL (more than 0.5) than normal 
activities (less than 0.5). Ultimately, the proposed network forensic technique can define attack 
activities and their risk level, helping network administrators to track and report bad events that 
try to penetrate their network.   
 
Table 1: Selected vectors with Risk Level (RL) 
srcip sport dstip dsport proto label RL 
149.171.126.14 179 175.45.176.3 33159 tcp 0 0.23 
175.45.176.1 15982 149.171.126.14 5060 udp 0 0.11 
175.45.176.3 63888 149.171.126.14 179 tcp 0 0.25 
175.45.176.2 7434 149.171.126.16 80 tcp 1 0.83 
175.45.176.0 15558 149.171.126.13 179 tcp 1 0.72 
5. Empirical results and discussions 
5.1 Dataset used and evaluation metrics   
 
In order to assess the performance of our proposed scheme, we used the UNSW-NB15 dataset 
because it comprises a large collection of contemporary legitimate and anomalous vectors. The 
size of its network packets is approximately 100 Gigabytes extracted 2,540,044 feature vectors 
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and was recorded in four CSV files. Each vector contains 47 features and the class label. It 
involves ten classes, one normal and nine types of security events and malware, namely 
Analysis, DoS, Exploits, Fuzzers for suspicious activity, Generic, Reconnaissance, Backdoors, 
Shellcode and Worms.  
The evaluation criteria of accuracy and False Alarm Rate (FAR) are applied to measure the 
performance of the proposed scheme for identifying and tracking attack vectors. These criteria 
are described as follows.  
 Accuracy- is the percentage of legitimate and suspicious vectors that are correctly 
identified, that is, 
 
TP TN
Accuracy
TP TN FP FN


  
 
(8) 
 
 
 FAR- is the percentage of normal and malicious vectors that are incorrectly classified, 
that is,  
 
FP FN
FAR
TP TN FP FN


  
 
(9) 
5.2 Pre-processing and selecting feature and observation stages 
 
The proposed mechanisms were developed using the ‘R language’ on Windows 7 OS with 16 
GB RAM and an i7 CPU processor. To carry out the experiments, we chosen arbitrary samples 
from the UNSW-NB15 dataset with several sample sizes between 100,000 and 300,000 for 
selecting the important features using the chi-square method and investigating attack activities 
by the correntropy-variation technique.  In Table 2, eight important features are adopted using 
the chi-square technique based on their high weight.  
 
Table 2: Features selected for investigating attacks 
Weight Feature name Feature description 
0.592 sbytes                  source to destination bytes 
0.558       swin source TCP window advertisement 
0.552 dttl                    destination to source time to live 
0.551 stcpb                   source TCP sequence number 
0.550 dtcpb destination TCP sequence number 
0.549 dwin destination TCP window advertisement 
0.513 smean mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the source  
0.489 sload source bits per second 
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The feature vectors and flow identifiers (i.e., source IP (srcip), source port (sport), destination 
IP (dstip), destination source (dsport) and protocol types (proto)) are selected using the SRS 
technique in order to remove repeated instances or missing values, improving the overall 
performance of the RCNF scheme. As demonstrated in Table 1, an example of select five 
vectors from the USNW-NB15 dataset was designed to show how the risk level is computed. 
Then, these levels are connected with their flow identifiers for analysis the evidence of attack 
activities. The SRS and chi-square techniques ensure selecting the relevant observations and 
features that reflect the patterns of legitimate and suspicious instances while running the 
network forensic technique.    
5.3 Network forensic evaluation  
 
It clear that the correntropy makes a clear difference between the legitimate and attack feature 
vectors, as it estimates the nonlinear similarities between these vectors. As shown in Figure 3, 
the correntropy values of 2000 normal samples are obviously different from attack ones. As a 
result, the different attack types can be considerably identified and investigated their paths 
using the five flow identifiers of source/destination IP addresses and protocol types associated 
with their risk level, as listed in Table 1.  
 
Figure 3: correntropy of some normal and attack samples 
The performance of the technique is evaluated in terms of the overall accuracy and FAR on the 
feature selected in Table 1. Moreover, the ROC curve which shows the relationship between 
the accuracy and FAR with different three sample sizes is shown in Figure 3. The overall 
accuracy improved from 94.31% to 95.98%, whilst the overall FAR reduced from 5.69% to 
4.02 % with increasing the sample sizes of data from 100,000 to 300,000.  
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Table 3: Performance of correntropy-variation technique 
Sample size Accuracy FAR 
100,000 94.31% 5.69 % 
200,000 95.72% 4.28 % 
300,000 95.98% 4.02 % 
 
 
Figure 4: ROC curves of correntropy-variation technique for three sample sizes 
The proposed mechanism can effectively recognise different attack vectors in the dataset, as 
declared in Table 4. The accuracy of detecting normal vectors increases from 92.12% to 
93.29% while increasing the sample size from 100,000 to 300,000. Likewise, the accuracy of 
recognising malicious vectors rise up progressively from an average of 45.82% to an average 
of 97.55% 
Table 4: Comparison of vector accuracy on three sample sizes 
 Sample size 
Vector types 100,000 200,000 300,000 
Normal 92.12% 93.16% 93.29% 
Exploits 76.47% 77.82% 77.19% 
Backdoor 54.42% 71.23% 72.42% 
Shellcode 65.76% 66.48% 65.98% 
Worms 45.82% 45.92% 48.87% 
DoS 95.71% 95.13% 97.55% 
Analysis 88.26% 89.45% 90.22% 
Fuzzers 64.33% 65.23% 66.28% 
Reconnaissance 58.38% 59.24% 60.32% 
Generic 83.56% 87.52% 88.87% 
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The Correntropy-Variation network forensic (CV-NF) technique is compared with three state-
of-the art techniques, namely Filter-based Support Vector Machine (FSVM) [27], Multivariate 
Correlation Analysis (MCA) [28] and Artificial Immune System (AIS) [29] using the UNSW-
NB15 dataset. The results revealed that the CV-NF technique outperforms the other 
mechanisms in terms of accuracy and FAR, as depicted in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of performance of four techniques  
The reason for outnumbering the CV-NF technique is that it developed based on estimating the 
correntropy values for normal and testing observations, and then considering any observation 
varies than 2σ of normal measures as attacks. The FSVM and AIS mechanism depend on 
training legitimate and malicious observations with large numbers of vectors to be correctly 
trained and validated, whereas the MCA technique relies on only computing correlations 
between attributes with the Gaussian mixture model to identify the DoS attacks, which 
sometimes cannot precisely identify the boundaries between legitimate and suspicious mixture 
models [30]. 
6. Conclusion and future directions 
 
This paper discussed a new real-time collaborative network Forensic scheme (RCNF) for 
monitoring and defining the origins of cyber-attacks. The scheme involves three key steps: 
capturing and storing network data, selecting important network features and investigating 
abnormal activities. The important observations and features are selected using the chi-square 
and SRS methods, respectively, whilst investigating and identifying suspicious events are 
developed using a correntropy variation technique in order to define high-risk levels as attack 
evidence. The analysis evidence of attacks by correlating risk levels estimated with their flow 
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identifiers. The scheme has been evaluated using the UNSW-NB15 dataset, and the results 
revealed its efficiency and effectiveness, in terms of accuracy and error rates, compared with 
three existing mechanisms. In future, we will apply the proposed scheme in cloud and fog 
computing systems due to their prevalence in our era.  
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